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Biosecurity Externalities and Indemnities for Infectious Animal Diseases 
 
 
Abstract 
In animal agriculture, biosecurity decisions are dispersed across many herd owners. Choices 
impacting disease spread will be determined by impacts on private economic values, and so are 
economic externalities. However, externalities are not all alike. By way of three very distinct 
examples, we demonstrate how they differ and what these differences mean for approaches to 
policies seeking to manage them. The three examples are an endemic disease pool that can be 
managed by limiting sources and flows, an exotic disease that can be managed by way of 
communicated coordination, and an infrastructural support externality that can be managed by 
disease outbreak insurance. We pay particular attention to how concentration in animal herd 
ownership affects incentives for disease control. 
 
JEL Classifications: D2, H4, Q1 
Keywords: business continuity, complements, infrastructure, substitutes. 
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Introduction 
By definition, an infectious disease is a disease that can spread from one biological entity to 
another. In profit-motivated agriculture, many biosecurity decisions of relevance to a region 
are dispersed across many animal herd owners and will be determined by impacts on private 
economic values. The biosecurity choices are economic externalities, in that the decisionmaker 
does not face the full consequence of choices made. However, externalities can differ greatly in 
form and implication. By way of three very distinct examples, we demonstrate how they differ 
and what these differences mean for approaches to policies intended to manage them.  
The first example is that of an endemic disease pool that can be managed by limiting 
infection sources and flows. In this context, we show why private disease control efforts 
substitute for one another, thus reducing the incentive for each herd owner to manage the 
disease. The extent of the problem is likely worse when animal ownership is dispersed among 
many farms. The second example regards preventing entry of an exotic disease. We show that 
in this case, and up to a point, herd owners are well incentivized to make private disease 
control efforts. However, a concentrated herd ownership structure likely exacerbates the 
problem because smaller herd owners (e.g., backyard) have less incentive to use control efforts, 
and may be the weakest link. We argue that fostering communication among herd owners 
would likely reduce the extent of the public disease problem. The third example turns attention 
to an infrastructural support externality. Here when one farm, likely the least profitable, drops 
out, then the fixed costs of supporting sector-related infrastructure falls on fewer farms and so 
profitability among remaining firms declines. We show that disease outbreak insurance helps 
when managing this form of externality. However, in light of the role that government may 
play in deciding control measures, we also argue that it would be difficult to sustain a private 
sector animal disease outbreak insurance market. 
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Endemic Disease Pool Context 
Model 
Our concern here is with an infectious disease that a farm may contract in light of its presence 
in the ambient environment. Our reduced-form model of farm-level infection is as follows: 
There are {1,2, ... , } Nn N    growers. At any point in time, the nth firm contributes time 
invariant flow 0nx   to the stock of infection on the nth farm. This flow can be controlled, and 
our intent is to characterize incentives to control this flow. Farm input at level nz  directly 
reduces nx  so that net infection flow to the nth farm becomes n nx z , but we assume that 
incentives are such that n nz x . The stock of infection on the nth farm at time t is given as 
( )nq t , which is the share of the nth farm’s herd that is infected. Some of this can escape into 
the external environment, henceforth referred to as the “pool.” The rate of escape is ( )nq t  
with 0   (i.e., in proportion to stock ( )nq t ). Of course, escape does not involve depleting the 
stock of infection on the farm. The on-farm stock of infection decays at rate ( )nq t  with 0  . 
Infection also spreads the other way, from the pool to individual farms. The pool’s stock of 
infection is ( )P t  and the flow from the pool to each farm is given by ( )P t , 0  . Finally, 
the pool’s stock of infection changes at rate ( )p px z P t  , 0  , where pz  is the extent of 
public effort to reduce direct infection flow into the public pool. As Figure 1 depicts, the flow 
equations are1  
 
( ) ( ) ( ), ;
( ) ( ) ( ).
N
n
n n n N
n p pn
dq t x z q t P t n
dt
dP t q t x z P t
dt
 
 
    
   
       (1.1) 
Now in equilibrium we have  
                                                 
1 Of course the linear form of the flow dynamics for ( )nq t  does not guarantee that ( ) [0,1]nq t  ,  
so our model is to be viewed as an approximation. 
3 
 
 
0 ( ) ( ), ;
0 ( ) ( );
N
n n n N
n p pn
x z q t P t n
q t x z P t
 
 
    
           (1.2) 
where we write the time-invariant solutions as 1 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ... , , )Nq q q P . Label ˆ ˆ
N
nn
Q q  , X 
N
nn
x  and N nnZ z  , so that the first N equations in (1.2) can be aggregated to 
ˆ ˆQ X Z NP    . The second equation in (1.2) yields ˆˆ p pP Q x z    . Solving these two 
equations obtains  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆˆ ; ;p p p p
X Z x z X Z N x z
P Q
N N
   
   
           (1.3) 
where N   is assumed to ensure interior solutions. That is, disease decay rates need to 
be sufficiently large relative to disease spread rates or disease incidence will explode, and 
management activities would not be of the form we are presently considering. 
To identify the steady-state level of ambient infection, from (1.2) we have ( )nq t 
[ ( )] /n nx z P t   , and so 
 
1 2 \ \ 3 \ \
1 2 32 2
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ); ; ;
( 1) ; ; .
n n n n n p p n n n nq x z X Z x z X X x Z Z z
N
N N N
  
          
         
     
(1.4) 
Equation (1.4) provides the equilibrium stock of infection on a given farm. One can check with 
reference to Figure 1 for intuitive responses to the model parameters.  
The key points that I’d like to draw your attention to are these: Efforts targeted at reducing 
some nx  (and so nq ) and efforts targeted at reducing some kx  (and so kq ), k n , are 
substitutes. By this we mean that ˆ / 0n kq z    and ˆ / 0k nq z   . Also, 1 2 1 / 0      so 
that the own-farm effect of targeting infection exceeds benefits derived from other farms 
targeting infection (i.e., the substitution is not perfect). Finally this pooled infection problem is 
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essentially one of managing an impure public good (Cornes and Sandler 1986) where benefits 
from own provision of the good exceed benefits to others. 
 
On-farm Choices 
We turn now to on-farm damage. Each herd owner seeks to protect a livestock herd of potential 
value nV  against infection by an endemic disease. Here nV  represents net profit in a disease-
free state and absent biosecurity costs. The cost of action nz  is given as ( )nC z  with marginal 
cost '( ) 0C    and second derivative ( ) 0C   . Loss is given as share ˆnq  so that production is 
given as ˆ(1 )n nq V . The Nash-behavior grower solves 
 1 2 \ \ 3max [1 ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ).nz n n n n p p n nx z X Z x z V C z         ,    (1.6) 
with private optimality condition 
 1 '( ) 0,n nV C z           (1.7) 
and Nash equilibrium choice (labeled superscripted ne) level 
 ne 11( ); ( ) ' ( ).m m mz H V H C z          (1.8) 
Setting 
N
mm
NV V  , the sum of surpluses is  
  3 1 2 \ \[1 ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) .
N
p p m m m m m m mm
W x z NV V x z V X Z C z           (1.9) 
Insert (1.8) into objective function (1.9) to obtain total surplus under private actions as: 
 
 ne ne3 2 1
1
1[1 ( ) ( ) ] ( )
[ ( )].
N
N
p p m m mm
mm
W x z Z X NV V x H V
C H V
  



      



 (1.10) 
We now seek to measure concentration so that we can study its effects on private 
biosecurity incentives. The following approach to comparing concentration is from Marshall, 
Olkin, and Arnold (2009, p. 14). 
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Definition 1: Vector * * * *1 2( , , ... , )
N
NS s s s   is majorized by ** ** ** **1 2( , , ... , ) NNS s s s   
(written as * **S S ) if * **( ) ( )1 1
k k
i i Ni i
s s k      and * **( ) ( )1 1N Ni ii is s   , where the ( )is  are 
defined as order statistics, (1) (2) ( )... Ns s s   .  
 
Equivalently, if one transfers some of a small is  value to a large is  value so that the former 
is smaller and the latter larger, then the result is a vector that majorizes the initial vector. As an 
example, consider * (3,5,4)S   and ** (5,2,5)S  . Now 3 2 , 3 4 2 5    and 3 4 5    
2 5 5  , so that * **S S . Of the two, **S  is the more concentrated because one can transfer 
one unit from a “5” to the unit with “2,” to bring a “5” to “4” and the “2” to “3,” making the 
vector’s coordinates more uniform. If we think of the coordinates as herd sizes, then the 
approach allows for a comparison of different herd ownership concentrations. Proof of the 
following is available in the appendix. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the flow of infection is constant across farms, or mx x 
Nm . Then in Nash equilibrium more dispersion in potential value in the majorization sense 
i) decreases equilibrium extent of disease, neQˆ , whenever marginal cost is convex, or ( ) 0C   , 
and ii) increases welfare, neW . 
Convex marginal cost, needed for item i) but not ii), seems reasonable as costs associated 
with biosecurity likely increase dramatically with a small increase in observed effectiveness. 
Consider the simple case of erecting a perimeter wall. If wall base scales with height then 
materials cost is in proportion to the square of height. But construction cost should increase 
dramatically with height as more elaborate scaffolding needs to be put in place to build at more 
elevated levels. On the other hand, it is hard to see why effectiveness against airborne 
biological invasion should increase dramatically with wall height. Point i) shows that animal 
stock concentration promotes the internalization of externalities if marginal costs become more 
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convex as input use increases. Point ii) shows that not only does disease loss decline with 
increasing concentration of animals but costs are covered too, so that welfare increases. 
The first-best problem involves recognizing total value when making the biosecurity 
decision. In other words, solving 
 
1( , ... , ) 1 2 \ \ 3
max [1 ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ).
N N N
z z m m m m p p m mm m
x z X Z x z V C z                (1.11) 
The social optimality conditions are  
 2 ( ) 0, ,n n N
V NV C z n           (1.12) 
and the socially optimum value is  
  so 1 2 .n nz H V NV         (1.13) 
Notice that so ne 1 2 1( ) ( ) 0n n n nz z H V NV H V        because ( )H   is an increasing function 
and 2 0NV  . Therefore, the socially optimum level of biosecurity exceeds the Nash 
equilibrium level and, furthermore, the difference depends on the value of 2 
2/ ( )N   . Thus the magnitude of the gap increases with how infectious the disease 
is, as reflected by the values of spread parameters   and  . 
Proposition 2: Nash equilibrium biosecurity efforts are less than socially optimal, and the 
magnitude of the difference depends on the magnitude of spread parameters.  
 
Suppose that veterinary authorities can act to reduce spread, perhaps through managing 
hygiene in transportation and at sales barns, by publically administered disease control 
schemes, or through education and outreach. They would have a two-fold effect on disease 
control because, in addition to directly reducing the extent of the infection pool, such actions 
would help strengthen the private payoffs that herd owners would receive for taking 
biosecurity actions.  
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Weakest Link in Disease Entry Context 
We turn now to consideration of a disease not presently in a region, but where there is a risk of 
entry. For the sake of clarity, we present a polar extreme of how disease enters and spreads in a 
region. Probability of entry is greatest at the weakest link, which we take to be the farm that is 
least motivated to take biosecurity precautions. Thereafter the disease spreads instantly to all 
other farms in the region but there is some probability that each farm can stop entry at its 
border. This is a generalization of the well-known von Liebig and Sprengel law of the 
minimum technology, but where each link is managed independently. Independent 
management would suggest that private biosecurity costs will enter the decision calculus but 
benefits beyond the herd-owner’s own farm are ignored.  
To illustrate numerically, suppose that Farms A and B are in an otherwise isolated region. 
Farms A and B both avoid a $100 loss if the disease stays out. If either Farm A or B lets the 
disease in it will certainly spread to the other farm for sure. It costs the herd owner $20 to make 
some effort to be certain that the disease doesn’t enter. If either farm doesn’t make the effort 
then the disease enters that farm directly with probability 0.25. If Farm A knows that Farm B 
makes the effort then Farm A compares expected loss of 100*0.25 =25 with cost of 20 and also 
makes the effort. If Farm A knows that Farm B doesn’t make the effort then Farm A expects 
baseline revenue of 100*(1-0.25) = 75 and then compares the expected loss of 75*0.25 = 18.75 
with cost of 20. It is not rational for Farm B to take the action either. Thus, both farms can 
conclude that it is rational to biosecure or both farms can conclude that it is rational not to 
biosecure. A task of those seeking to coordinate disease management activities across the 
region is to help both farms coordinate on biosecuring.  
A version of the context has been studied in Hennessy (2008). The natural response is to 
take no more biosecurity precautions than any other grower in the region. But the herd owner 
that will likely take the least biosecurity action will be the one with least to protect (i.e., the 
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smallest herd owner). Thus, smaller herd owners will determine the overall risk of disease 
entry. But, in the spirit of Definition 1, if we transfer some animals from the larger herds to 
smaller herds then smaller herds are better incentivized to prevent entry. As they constitute the 
weakest link, a less concentrated herd structure may lead to a reduction in the likelihood of 
disease entry.  
The weakest link setting raises other issues. If small farms are the concern then targeting 
these may be an effective approach to reducing the overall risk of disease entry. This targeting 
could be through subsidies or other carrots, or through efforts to close these farms down. In 
addition, communication in itself may improve biosecurity levels across the sector. In Nash 
equilibrium, each herd owner assumes that everyone decides independently and takes the 
actions of others as given. However, herd owner actions complement, or reinforce, in 
protecting against a common external threat. If herd owners are of the view that others don’t 
take much care then they may agree not to take much care either. Similarly if herd owners are 
of the view that others do care then, in any herd owner’s mind, it becomes increasingly likely 
that his/her action will be important in deterring entry. Coaxing herd owners to protect and 
providing credible communication that others are protecting may gird herd owners to take 
biosecurity more seriously. Such communication could come in many forms.  
A noteworthy feature of many industry sectors in much of the world is the well-developed 
civic structure surrounding the sector. Adam Smith (1976, p. 152) took a dim view of industry 
associations, writing  
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to 
raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either 
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty or justice. But though the law 
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to 
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.” 
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However, on this the single-mindedness of Smith’s gaze may have been the product of a less 
technologically developed time. Business interests are not always in conflict with consumer 
interests. Efforts to pool information and coordinate on addressing technical problems that 
impede an industry can add to the welfare of all concerned. Such industry efforts are very 
evident in animal disease management programs around the world (see for example, OECD 
2012). Communication can also be fostered through organizational structures that facilitate 
knowledge and technology transfer, as can be the case with the cooperative and contracting 
business formats that are common in animal agriculture. 
 
Business Continuity, Insurance and Regulation Moral Hazard 
Taiwan was the world’s third largest pork exporter during the mid-1990s, exporting about 30% 
of its production to the Japanese market. In 1997 a Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak occurred 
on the island, closing its export markets. Through to 2013, the country has suffered sporadic 
disease recurrances and has never regained lost market shares (Felt, Gervais, and Larue 2011). 
The sector’s production structure has changed dramatically, in large part because sector players 
have lost confidence that any investments will be adequately rewarded.  
Although Taiwan’s pork industry troubles are more complex, here we turn to how business 
continuity risk can undermine a sector’s vitality. In particular we focus on a role for insurance 
to secure business continuity were a disease to occur. There are N farms and each produces 
output of value nV . If a disease occurs then all farms are afflicted and value declines to nV  . 
The farms equally share the cost of an input with fixed costs F. These costs can be of many 
forms. Animal breeding and feed used to be provided on-farm, but are generally purchased in 
modern production systems. In addition, animal agriculture increasingly relies on private sector 
management and information services that supply benchmark data, analytical tools and other 
inputs while environmental consultants seeking to better manage a herd’s environmental 
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footprint are also purchased. In many cases there is a large fixed cost component to the supply 
of these inputs. 
The hazard rate for the disease is given as the constant value b while that for recovery is 
given as the constant value a. It is readily shown that, with continuous time discount rate r, the 
capital values for diseased and disease-free states are 
 / / ( ); .
( ) ( )
DF Dn nV F N b V F N r b
r r r a b r r r a b
              (3.1) 
See Hennessy (2007) for details.  
Now firms with negative capital value in the diseased state exit. These are the firms with  
 Ins( )n
r b FV
r a b N
      ( ).N     (3.2) 
If one such firm exits then the floor below which another firm exits increases to ( 1)N  , as 
shown in Figure 2. The unbroken curve represents Ins ( )N  and is declining in N toward 
asymptotic value ( ) / ( )r b r a b    . The less steeply sloped line represents output values in 
descending order. The curves intersect at value InsN  so that firms with output values of InsV  
or higher will participate. The larger the participation rate is beyond InsN  the more profitable 
high-value farms will be. If fewer than InsN  farms participate then none of the other farms will 
either. 
An alternative is for firms to support an actuarially fair insurance program in which amount 
  is put aside in each year and amount   is returned in the diseased state. Then fair premium, 
set up in a disease-free environment satisfies / ( )b r a b     so that (3.1) becomes  
 ,Ins ,Ins/ ( ) / ( )( ); .
( ) ( )
DF Dn nV F N b V F N r b
r r r a b r r r a b
                            (3.3) 
In this case, firms with negative capital value in the diseased state are those for which  
 Ins( )( ) ( ).
( )n
r b FV N
r a b N
              (3.4) 
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Now, 
 Ins Ins( )N  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.r b F r b F r bN
r a b N r a b N r a b
                         (3.5) 
Insurance causes the floor to decline and so more firms remain in the business. Figure 2 
also depicts Ins ( )N , as the intermittently broken curve below that for Ins ( )N . This curve 
intersects the output value curve at value InsN , the new lower-threshold participation rate 
below which the regional production system collapses. In this way, insurance is a means to 
secure support for input and output networks so that the supply system does not collapse before 
recovery.  
But consider now the actual environment in which a private sector insurance market for 
highly contagious animal diseases would exist. Almost inevitably, government 
representatives will decide emergency plans to manage the disease. Government costs can 
take many forms, including those to the exchequer and political support costs. If no market 
insurance is available then a government may have to provide indemnities for political 
reasons, and perhaps also as a matter of promoting efficiency by seeking to avoid the sector’s 
collapse. These costs may affect other management decisions, such as how many animals to 
condemn for immediate slaughter. If market insurance was taken out widely by herd owners 
then the government might decide to increase the likelihood of ultimately stamping out the 
disease (rather than face Taiwan’s problem of repeated recurrence) by condemning more 
animals for slaughter as the government does not cover the cost of indemnification. This is 
an instance of regulatory moral hazard where, again, behavior adjusts to incomplete 
internalization of the consequences of the behavior.  
No government could commit to refraining from more costly approaches to disease 
management or be bound by some independent review of policy choices, even were such a 
review possible given time constraints. The possibility that disease management choices would 
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change to the detriment of the insurer could affect the extent of insurance coverage offered and 
rates charged. Regulatory moral hazard might in itself undermine the market’s viability. 
 
Conclusion 
By their very nature, infectious diseases that can be managed by changing behavior involve 
externalities. This paper has characterized some of these externalities, and has sought to point 
toward implications for disease management. There are two central points to be drawn. One is 
that, to be effective, coordinated centralized disease management strategies must recognize the 
implications of decentralized production. Many biosecurity actions and pertinent information 
lays with organizations that are neither controlled by the center nor possessed with incentives 
that are wholly consistent with the system as a whole. A more concentrated production system 
MAY be easier to work with as far as disease management is concerned, but that supposition is 
not to be taken for granted.  
The other point is that context matters. Although broad stylization of disease problems is 
inevitable if meaningful general lessons are to be extracted, a one-size-fits-all characterization 
does not exist. We have pointed to instances where public and private goals can be quite strongly 
aligned, as perhaps with the task of keeping a pest out of a region, and also to instances where 
they can diverge, as with free-riding to better control the extent of an endemic disease.  
If one generality does exist it is that patiently communicating and listening likely helps 
over an extended duration when educating and reminding herd owners of how they can 
contribute to a sector’s general well-being. An economist’s view on why is that it may help 
transform herd owners’ views on how far-thinking other herd owners are, and that 
transformation can be mutually reinforcing. Public animal health authorities already know this, 
although likely with their own take on the matter where trust may be what is emphasized. But 
it bears repetition as it may get little hearing when a sector is in crisis.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium extent of disease is given as  
 
1( ) ( )ˆ ,N
n p pn
X H V N x z
Q
N
   
 
   

     (A.1) 
so the issue resolves to what happens 1( )
N
nn
H V . It is readily shown that ne /n nz V    
1 / ( ) 0C     and 2 ne 2 2 31/ ( ) / [ ( )] 0n nz V C C          under convex marginal cost. Thus 
1( )nH V  is convex. This is relevant because an increase in the majorization sense increases the 
sum of convex functions (Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold 2009, p. 101). It follows that the 
equilibrium extent of disease decreases as the region’s animals become more concentrated in 
larger herds. 
On the second part,  
 ne ne ne ne3 1 2 \ \[1 ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) .
N
p p m m m m m m mm
W x z NV V x z V X Z C z                  (A.2) 
Due to summation across firms, this function is symmetric in the nV  evaluations. In other 
words, if we relabeled the firm index and also reassigned firm parameter values in the same 
way then welfare would not change. Also, due to the envelope theorem (Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
and Green 1995, pp. 964-966), when assessing the effects on welfare of an infinitesimal change 
in some nV  we may ignore effects that are mediated through the nth firm’s biosecurity choice, 
ne
mz . So we may write  
 
ne
ne ne
3 1 2 \ \1 ( ) ( ) ( ).p p n n n n
n
W x z x z X Z
V
              (A.3) 
Given that m Nx x m   , (A.3) implies  
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  (A.4) 
so that  
 
ne nene ne ( )( )( ) .n k n kn k
n k
z z V VW W V V
V V 
         
     (A.5) 
As nemz  is increasing in the value of mV , it follows that  
 
ne ne
( ) 0.n k
n k
W W V V
V V
       
     (A.6) 
This is the Ostrowski condition (Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold 2009, p. 20) on a symmetric 
function and functions satisfying it are larger upon majorization. That is, a more dispersed 
vector of farm outputs increases welfare under Nash equilibrium. 
 
Farm n,
infection 
level qn(t)
Pool infection 
dies at rate λP(t)
Pool infection
spreads to each 
premises at 
rate βP(t)
Ambient pool 
of infection, P(t)
Farm infection
spreads to ambient 
pool at rate αqn(t)
Farm infection 
dies at rate ηqn(t)
Controlled farm 
infection entry 
rate xn - zn
Pool infection 
entry rate xp
Figure 1. Model of animal disease, entry, spread,
and control.
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